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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VANDA HOLMAN NAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 14680 
MELVIN CHARLES NAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
1. Counsel for plaintiff and respondent dose not cite any Law in his Brief of 5 pages. 
2. The firm of Barclay and Barclay represented the plaintiff and respondent in a 
divorce action which the files, minute entry and index show, filed September 17, 1956. A 
divorce was granted to plaintiff and respondent upon September 19, 1956, by Judge Stewart 
M. Hanson, Sr. 
3. Neither David Barclay or L. J. Barclay represented the Defendant and Appellant at 
any time in the divorce action granted September 19, 1956. 
4. L. J. Barclay, Attorney at Law, the surviving member of the firm of Barclay and 
Barclay, Attorneys and Counselors at Law, never did at any time represent the Defendant 
and Appellant in any legal matter until the present matter. 
5. L. J. Barclay Attorney and Counselor at Law never did at any time kick or order the 
Plaintiff and Respondent to leave his office, and never made the statement to Plaintiff and 
Respondent that he was emnlnvpH hv thp npfpnHant onH A™>^HO^+ ;~ *u~ A:., *-•— 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. There is no evidence other than the statement of the Plaintiff and Respondent that 
Mr. McCuUough would not take her divorce case unless she could pay him a fixed sum of 
money. Knowing Mr. McCuUough for many years I know the statements of the Plaintiff 
and Respondent as to Mr. McCuUough are untrue and false. Queston what has such a 
statement pertaining to Mr. McCuUough have to do with the merits of this case? 
7. There is no evidence, whatsoever, that Plaintiff and Respondent and the Defendant 
and Appellant resumed their marital status or had any sexual intercourse, whatsoever, and 
no one testified that they did at the time of the trial. Question what has this to do with the 
merits of this case? 
8. True they met on various occasions to discuss the operation of the business property 
on South State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which they held jointly. 
9. Never at any time had the Decree of Divorce of September 19, 1956 been set aside. 
Plaintiff and Respondent and Defendant and Appellant never remarried each other after the 
Decree of Divorce of September 19, 1956, at least no marriage certificate was put in 
evidence. 
10. Counsel, L. J. Barclay, admits that he has a remarkable memory, which he has 
developed by extensive training. Counsel L. J. Barclay's memory was refreshed by the 
checking of the contents of the files in his office, the checking of the records in the County 
Recorders Office for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as to when Plaintiff and Respondent 
recorder her Warranty Deed from Defendant and Appellant, and when Defendant and 
Appellant recorded his Warranty Deed from the Plaintiff and Respondent, also the 
checking of the records in the Salt Lake County Treasurers Office to see who had paid the 
taxes on the respective pieces of property. 
11. The Salt Lake County Treasuerers Office shows that Plaintiff and Respondent paid 
taxes on the property that was deeded to her by Warranty Deed from the Defendant and 
Appellant. Defendant and Appellant paid taxes on the property deeded to him by Warranty 
Deed from Plaintiff and Respondent. 
12. The business property on South State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, held 
jointly by Plaintiff and Respondent and Defendant and Appellant each paid one-half of the 
taxes nersonallv. as per written agreement signed by both parties. 
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13. The statement that the Plaintiff and Respondent paid one-half of the taxes on the 
property deeded by Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant and Appellant is untrue and 
false according to the records in the Office of the Treasurer for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
14. Plaintiff and Respondent and Defendant and Appellant did pay the taxes and the 
mortgage on the acre but that was prior to the division of the property, as set out in the 
Warranty Deed of Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant and Appellant, and the Warranty 
Deed from the Defendant and Appellant to the Plaintiff and Respondent, and the written 
agreement signed by Plaintiff and Respondent and Defendant and Appellant as to the 
management and their respective interest in the business property on South State Street, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
15. The reason that Plaintiff and Respondent did not receive any alimony at the time of 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce was because she waived her alimony, because she wanted 
the property upon which the duplex was located, she was living in one side rent free, and 
renting the other side for $140.00 per month, plus she was reciving $175,.00 a month from 
the business property making a total of $315.00 a month income. 
16. The only reason that my office ever got into this case was because of the repeated 
lies and accusations by both Plaintiff and Respondent and her Attorney and Counsel at 
Law, Nolan J. Olsen. The file speaks for its self. Plaintiff and Respondent aided by her 
Counsel have stated to many people and on may occasions that she did not sign the 
Warranty Deed from her to the Defendant and Appellant. That it was not notarized by 
Lawrence J. Barclay, and not witnessed by David Barclay that it was a forgery. That on one 
occasion after this action had been started Defendant and Appellant brought Plaintiff and 
Respondent to my office regarding the Warranty Deed signed by her to Defendant and 
Appellant. L. J. Barclay stated to the Plaintiff and Respondent what do you mean by telling 
stories that the Warranty Deed signed by you is a forgery. 
To which the Plaintiff and Respondent in the presents of her 3 daughters, her son 
in-law, Isabel Barclay, Mr. Naylor and myself that it was not her signature and that Nolan 
had said it was not her signture, further if it was her signature she must have been drunk 
when she signed it. Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent told Defendant and Appellant Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Warranty Deed of Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant and Appellant that it was not her 
signature, and could not be her signature and he made comparisons of her signature after 20 
years. He also told Defendant and Appellant that according to the Divorce file he was not 
even divorced from the Plaintiff and Respondent. When Defendant and Respondent tried to 
explain the transaction by saying call Mr. L. J. Barclay because he knows all about the 
matter. Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent I do not want anything to do with L. J. 
Barclay and took the Defendant and Appellant to the door of his office. 
17. Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent has on many occasions stated to Joseph R. 
Howell that his client was old, senile for forget full. He also has made the same statement to 
L. J. Barclay and Isabel Barclay that his client was old, senile and forgetfull. I am interest 
in upholding the integrity of myself, my office and that of my deceased brother, David 
Barclary. My deceased brother, David Barclay, who managed the office of Barclay and 
Barclay prepared all of the papers in this matter. He was present on all occasions including 
the time when Plaintiff and Respondent received $1,000.00 for her interest in the back 
property which she sold to the Defendant and Appellant. He was also present when Plaintiff 
and Respondent received the sum of $147.75 the difference in the value of the personal 
property that each party to the divorce action received, making a total of $1,147.75 paid to 
Plaintiff and Respondent upon the 15th day of August, 1956. I say once more as I have 
often said during this case, and I also said it to Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., if only my 
deceased brother could come back and talk and explain the situation. The Plaintiff and 
Respondent at one time denied that she ever received the sum of $1,147.75 from the office 
of Barclay and Barclay, her Attorneys and Counselors at law. 
18. The letter of August 31, 1957 was mailed to the Plaintiff and Respondent pertaining 
to her question as to the business property on South State Street, Salt lake County, State of 
Utah, was more than 2 months after the signing and the recording of the 2 Warranty Deeds, 
one from Plaintiff and Respondent to the Defendant and Appellant and one from 
Defendant and Appellant to the Plaintiff and Respondent. 
19. As to the actions of Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., I am at a loss to understand 
why that he was so anxious to exclude me from the Court room. Why that he continually 
t^ iH TCQVIPI Rarrlflv to cret me out of the Court room, take me to dinner or back to the 
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office, but get me out of the Courts Building. Why he objected to me being a witness for the 
Defendant and Appellant. I am told that his health has been impaired both physical and 
mental for the past 2 years, and that he was tired and weary of his work because of being 
over loaded with work. I have also heard of 2 other reasons. 
20. Counsel Joseph R. Howell requested L. J. Barclay to aid him in the trial of this 
matter, and to be a witness as to the real facts in the matter, stating to L. J. Barclay that he 
knew all about the case. At the time of the trial Counsel Joseph R. Howell was recovering 
from a heart attack, plus he had a sore foot. His physical condition was apparent to the 
Court because Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. told Counsel that he could sit down to try the 
case. 
21. All during these proceedings prior to the time of the trial the Plaintiff and 
Respondent and her Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, contended that the Warranty Deed from 
Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant and Appellant was a forgery. Counsel, Joseph R. 
Howell, was taken by surprise when Plaintiff and Respondent and her Counsel, Nolan J. 
Olsen, admitted under oath that she had signed the Deed. Plaintiff and Respondent and her 
Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen then stated and introduced P. 10, which was a list of personal 
property, which Plaintiff and Respondent and her Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen contended was 
for the $1,147.75 by her from her than Attorneys and Counselors at Law, Barclay and 
Barclay, by L. J. Barclay. 
21. Counsel, Joseph R. Howell, was taken by surprise when Judge Stewart M. Hanson, 
Sr. took the bench and waived the original Divorce files stating I know all about the case. 
Next when Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. said to L. J. Barclay what are you doing here, to 
which L. J Barclay responded I am here to protect my integrity, the integrity of my office 
and that of my deceased brother and partner, David Barclay. To which Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson said we will exclude witness L. J. Barclay. Then Counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, moved to 
the exclusion of the witness to-wit L. J. Barclay, Attorney and Counselor at Law. 
22. P. 10 The list of personal property introduced at the time of the trial never at any 
time existed until the time of the trial. Plaintiff and Respondent and her Counsel, Nolan J. 
Olsen, were well aware of this fact. Many of the articles were not in existence and were 
purchased after the Decree of Divorce signed Sentemher 1Qth 10^^ TVI^  ™ « ^ * O ^ +u~ 
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alleged P. 10 is contrary to 5 B of the complaint in the Divorce action, (b. That the parties 
hereto have to their mutual satisfaction made divisions between themselves of all personal 
property owned by them,) and 5 B of the Findings of Fact, (5 b. That the paties hereto have 
to their mutual satisfaction made division between themselves of all personal property 
owned by them) together with the Bill of Sale from Plaintiff and Respondent to Defendant 
and Appellant signed upon the 26th day of June, 1957, and the Bill of Sale signed by the 
Defendant and Appellant to the Plaintiff and Respondent upon the 26th day of June 1957. 
23. As a conclusion both Counsel for Defendant and Appellant are unable to 
understand the tactics of Plaintiff and Respondent and her Attorney and Cpounselor at 
Law, Nolan J. Olsen, in face of 2 Warranty Deeds made, executed and delivered to the 
respective parties upon the 26th day of June, 1957, and recorded by each paty in the office 
of the County Recorder for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, almost 20 years ago, 2 Bills of 
Sale made, executed and delivered upon the 26th day of June, 1957, covering the personal 
property that each party was to receive, the agreement signed by both parties signed upon 
June 26th 1957, as to the management of the business property on South State Street, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted 
Joseph R. Howell 
and 
L. J. Barclay 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
Melvin Charles Naylor 
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